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Abstract: 
This article adds to our understanding of the role of norms in the European Union’s (EU) 
response to the migration crisis by conducting a critical assessment of the EU’s anti-smuggling 
naval mission ‘Sophia’. Is Sophia in line with the normative standards the EU has set for itself 
in the conduct of its foreign policy? Conducting the analysis in two steps in line with the main 
criteria of a humanitarian foreign policy model – first exploring Sophia’s launch and then 
assessing Sophia’s in theater behavior – findings suggest that although concerns for migrants 
at sea mobilized the initial launch of the mission, the conduct of the mission is not in line with 
key human rights principles. As the operation mandate is amended and updated with new tasks, 
and as the EU-NATO in theater cooperation increases, the EU is moving further away from 




This article adds to our understanding of the role of norms in the European Union’s (EU) 
response to the migration crisis by conducting a critical assessment of the legitimacy of the 
EU’s anti-smuggling naval mission ‘Sophia’. Empirical studies have suggested that the EU is 
a “normative”, “ethical” or “humanitarian” foreign policy actor, due to its focus on promoting 
human rights and multilateral cooperation (cf. Cross 2011, Diez 2005; Kissack 2010; Manners 
2002, Orbie 2008, Riddervold 2011, Sjursen 2006). This is also how the EU often describes 
itself, including when justifying operation Sophia. According to the EU, Sophia was launched 
in 2015 in response to the migrant crisis in the Mediterranean, as increasingly more people died 
at sea while trying to reach Europe’s shores. For example, in their Council`s decision on the 
launch of a naval mission, the EU member states argue that the mission was launched to tackle 




at sea (Council 2015a).  According to the EU itself all of the activities undertaken by Sophia 
moreover ‘adhere to and respect international law, including human rights, humanitarian and 
refugee law and the non refoulement principle meaning that no rescued persons can be 
disembarked in a third country” (EEAS 2016).  Critiques of Sophia have however questioned 
the mission’s legitimacy, claiming instead that the EU’s ‘approach fails migrants by 
predominantly focusing on the challenges posed to the EU, rather than on those faced by the 
human beings whose lives continue to be lost at sea’ (Berry et al 2016: 4). In other words, that 
although presenting the mission as humanitarian, in reality and in order to reduce migration to 
the EU, Sophia does not live up to the human rights standards the EU claims to respect. 
Actually, at the outset, this description of Sophia almost seems intuitively right: In light of the 
chaos taking place on the EU’s borders, the de facto break up of Schengen, the rise of populist 
parties and what appears as the EU’s inability to come up with common solutions to the 
migration crisis, it is reasonable to assume that both the EU institutions and the member states 
would look for ways of curbing migration to limit these problems. This article studies the 
relevance of this claim by conducting an in-depth critical assessment of the legitimacy of EU 
Sophia. Is Sophia in line with the normative standards the EU sets for itself in its foreign policy? 
In order to answer this question, the article assesses whether or not the mission is in line with 
what one would expect of a humanitarian foreign policy (Eriksen 2009; Riddervold, 2011: 
Sjursen 2006). Analytically, and as set out in more detail below, the two defining criteria of a 
humanitarian policy are first, that it focuses on protecting and strengthening global norms, i.e. 
human rights law, in the international system, and second, that it is willing to bind itself to such 
norms in conducting its foreign policy (Eriksen 2009; Sjursen 2006. Also see Riddervold 2011). 
If Sophia is in line with such a foreign policy model, it would thus not only have been launched 
foremost as an attempt to rescue people in distress at sea and prioritize this task in theater. 
Sophia would also have to be conducted in line with the relevant human rights conventions, 
including the refugee convention, as discussed further below.  
Exploring the extent to which Sophia is in line with a humanitarian foreign policy model 
is important for several reasons. Empirically, although having been operational for three years 
and despite the huge attention paid to the EU’s migration policies amongst academics and 
observers alike, one of the few actions that the EU member states have actually agreed to 
undertake, EU mission Sophia, has so far not been studied systematically. This is puzzling not 
only in light of the ongoing debate about EU migration policies, but also from the perspective 




tangible tools in the EU’s attempts to deal with the migration crisis, understanding the basis for 
its launch and the extent to which it lives up to the EU’s human rights standards might be 
indicative of EU migration policies more broadly. Second, Sophia is the EU’s second naval 
mission, contributing not only to a further militarization of EU foreign and security policies but 
also to a further strengthening of the maritime element of this development (Germond 2015). 
As with the EU’s anti-piracy naval mission off the coast of Somalia, Atalanta, Sophia is 
moreover the biggest of the international missions operating in the waters outside of Libya, and 
in both cases, it is NATO who assists the EU and not the other way around, suggesting that the 
EU is indeed developing a stronger and more independent foreign and security policy. 
Understanding the launch and conduct of Sophia thus also adds to our understanding of the 
EU’s foreign policy ambitions. Nonetheless, and at a difference to Atalanta who has been 
studied extensively in this and other journals (see, for example Bueger 2016; Germond and 
Smith 2009; Riddervold 2011, 2014), Sophia remains unexplored. Assessing Sophia is also 
important from an analytical perspective, as Sophia puts the EU’s claim of protecting and 
promoting human rights norms to a particularly hard test. The migration crisis not only 
challenges the EU’s internal solidarity but also its ability and willingness to live up to its 
proclaimed normative standards.  If this study finds that the EU with Sophia nonetheless lives 
up to its human rights principles, it would thus strengthen the argument that the EU indeed is a 
normative or humanitarian foreign policy actor. If, on the other hand, the analysis suggests that 
the EU does not live up to the principles it has set for itself in its foreign policy conduct, it might 
indicate that the EU is less able and willing to do so when the stakes are high.  
The reminder of the article is organized as follows. A first part describes the case and 
introduces the conceptual framework, developing and operationalizing the humanitarian 
foreign policy model and setting out the article’s methodological approach. In doing this, I first 
also briefly set out the analytically opposite to a humanitarian foreign policy model, namely the 
rational choice based traditional model of foreign policy. The following section contains the 
analysis, which is structured in two parts in line with the two defining criteria of a humanitarian 
foreign policy. I first discuss whether there is evidence to suggest that Sophia was launched due 
to concerns for migrants in distress at sea. Second, I go on to explore whether or not the 
implementation of Sophia – the EU’s in theater behavior – is consistent with a humanitarian 
model of EU foreign policy, that is, if it is conducted in accordance with relevant human rights 
law, as argued by the EU itself. The conclusion sums up the findings and discusses their 




the EU`s foreign and security policies more broadly. 
 
2. Case and framework  
2.1. EU operation Sophia 
Operation EUNAVFORMED Sophia (Sophia) was launched in June 2015 as part of the 
EU`s response to what has been commonly referred to as the “Mediterranean”, “migration” or 
“refugee crisis.” With 1, 255, 600 first time migrants applying for asylum in the EU and 3,771 
people dying in the attempt in 2015 alone (Eurostat 2016), the EU member states have struggled 
to find ways to deal with migrants coming mainly by boat to the EU border states. Internally, 
the Union saw the de facto annulment of the Dublin regulations when Germany opened its 
borders to Syrian refugees, while other member states built fences to protect theirs (Dernbach 
2015). In response, a special meeting of the European Council in April 2015 concluded that the 
EU would “mobilise all efforts at its disposal to prevent further loss of life at sea and to tackle 
the root causes of the human emergency” (European Council 2015a).  Part of this, the member 
states agreed to strengthen the EU`s “presence at sea, to fight the traffickers, to prevent illegal 
migration flows and to reinforce internal solidarity and responsibility,” including a naval 
mission within the framework of the EU’s Maritime Security Strategy (Council 2015).  
As with all EU civilian missions and military operations, decisions on Sophia fall under 
the special Common Security and Defence (CSDP) intergovernmental procedures, whereby 
member states decide unanimously on proposals from the member states or the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP). The Political and Security 
Committee (PSC), composed of national ambassadors and chaired by the EEAS, has the 
political control and ensures the strategic direction of crisis management operations, based on 
the member states’ decisions. The member states’ military contribution to EU operation is 
voluntary, and they cover the costs themselves. Military operations are however conducted 
under common EU command. There is thus also a joint budget for Sophia, which is shared by 
the EU members, foremost covering the running costs of the Operational Headquarter in Rome, 
Italy, and the Force Headquarters in theatre (EEAS 2017).  
Sophia is to be conducted in four sequential phases. The first was a deployment and 
assessment phase, focusing on information gathering and patrolling of the high seas to monitor 
migrant smuggling activities. The second, still ongoing phase involves the boarding, search, 




trafficking on the high seas (“2A”). Phase 2B is to extend this to the territorial and internal 
waters of Libya, provided that the EU obtains a mandate from the UN Security Council (UNSC) 
or the approval of the Libyan authorities (“2B”). Also depending on Libyan consent or UN 
authorization, in the third phase, Sophia will actively seek to disrupt the smugglers’ networks 
by disposing of the suspected vessels or rendering them inoperable. Finally, in the fourth phase, 
the EU will withdraw its forces and end the operation. So far, the UNSC has only agreed on a 
resolution allowing the EU (and other forces, like NATO) to conduct boarding and search on 
the high seas, but not in Libya’s territorial waters (UNSCR 2015). The Libyan government has 
not given its consent either, which is why Sophia thus far has not moved beyond phase 2A. In 
June 2016, the Council added two new supporting tasks to the mission: training the Libyan navy 
and coastguard and contributing to the implementation of the UN arms embargo to Libya 
(European Council 2016). Since November 2016, the EU forces also receive support from the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s Sea Guardian (NATO 2016). Since the EU 
cannot carry out legal investigation of suspected smugglers or traffickers, it is the member states 
that have jurisdiction over such investigations, in line with relevant international law provisions. 
Sophia is innovative in several ways. Together with Atalanta and the EU Maritime 
Security Strategy, it confirms the maritime turn in the EU Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
in the management of new types of security threats. It also brings the CFSP, including the 
CSDP, closer to the EU’s internal security policies “in the sense that an internal security and 
societal challenge is partly handled (…) through an action that takes place outside of the EU” 
(Tardy 2015: 2). Sophia is also potentially the first EU military operation with an openly 
coercive mandate. At a difference to other EU military missions, including Atalanta, operation 
Sophia has a more robust mandate under UN Chapter VII and its measures can be implemented 
in the territorial waters of a third state, even in the absence of the consent of the concerned state, 
provided the existence of a UN mandate. This resembles more of a peace enforcement mission, 
which may imply as much as “a qualitative shift in the EU’s security and defence posture” 
(Ibid). This coercive element is however also the main reason why so far, the EU has not got 
such a mandate from the UN Security Council or the Libyan government to proceed to phase 






2.2. Framework: A humanitarian mission? 
To assess whether or not Sophia is in line with the human rights standards the EU itself 
claims it has set for itself in the conduct of its foreign policy, including Sophia, the framework 
applied distinguishing between two analytically distinct but empirically overlapping models of 
foreign policy – a traditional and a humanitarian model. One of the main debates in the literature 
on EU foreign and security policies has been linked to its main characteristics and in particular, 
to what, if any, role norms play in the making and conduct of common policies. On the one 
hand, scholars applying rational choice based perspectives argue that their conventional state-
based analytical tools and models can describe and explain EU foreign policies. Although there 
are major differences between neo-liberal and neo-realist approaches within the rational choice 
based tradition, building on such perspectives, one would expect that once the EU acts on the 
international scene, its behaviour will be in line with what we expect of a traditional foreign 
policy actor (Hyde-Price 2006, 2008, Moravcsik 2010; Schimmelfennig 2003). In the same 
manner as states, the EU’s foreign policy would follow from an internal aggregation of interests 
and the main aim would be to promote these interests in the most efficient way available. If the 
EU refers to or promotes particular norms, this would be a strategic choice. The main aim would 
be to advance the member states’ common preferences, and any reference to or promotion of 
human rights would be instruments in this regards, which in the literature is referred to as the 
use of ‘smart’ or ‘soft’ power (Cooper 2003; Nye 2004). At the very least, norms will always 
be secondary to material interests only. Following a traditional foreign policy model, one would 
in other words expect the EU to conduct mission Sophia first and foremost in order to curb and 
reduce migration to Europe. As mentioned in the introduction, considering the economic and 
political costs associated with growing migratory pressures, such an explanation seems almost 
intuitively right. During the last years, the increase in the number migrants coming to the EU 
has not only been financially costly, at least in the short run, but it has also helped fuel populist 
parties across the continent, increased the fear of terrorist attacks and undermined one of the 
core foundations of the EU itself, namely free movement across the internal market. Precisely 
for these reasons, the explosion of migrants coming to the EU has commonly been labelled as 
a crisis, by both officials and observers alike (see for example Berry et al. 2016; Trauner 2016).  
On the other side of the spectrum and drawing on constructivist International Relations 
perspectives, a number of scholars have on the basis of empirical studies argued that the EU is 
a ‘normative’, ‘civilian’ or ‘ethical’ foreign policy actor. Although there is much variation 




for the good’, promoting norms rather than self-interests when acting on the international scene 
(Duchêne 1972; Kissack 2010; Manners 2002; Orbie 2008). As mentioned in the introduction, 
this is also very much in line with the way the EU describes its own foreign policy, including 
EU mission Sophia. A number of authors have however questioned both the theoretical 
robustness and the analytical usefulness of concepts such as ‘normative’ or ‘civilian’ foreign 
policies (Diez 2005; Börzel and Risse 2007; Hyde-Price 2008; Sjursen 2006a). In particular, 
due to the lack of clear analytical categories, it is often challenging to identify a normative (as 
opposed to a non-normative) policy empirically, making it difficult to control for rhetorical 
action. Moreover, scholarly definitions of a normative policy are often linked to the use of 
civilian or soft foreign policy means, hence limiting their applicability when studying cases 
involving the use of force, such as military operations (Riddervold 2011). In order to overcome 
these challenges and better understand why Sophia was launched and is conducted, this article 
operationalizes and applies Eriksen and Sjursen’s humanitarian foreign policy model (Eriksen 
2009; Sjursen 2006; Sjursen 2012. Also see Riddervold 2011). A humanitarian policy is defined 
by two main criteria: first, its focuses on strengthening global norms, i.e. human rights law, in 
the international system, and second, the foreign policy actor in question is willing to bind itself 
to such norms in conducting its foreign policy (Eriksen 2009; Sjursen 2006). This distinction 
between global and international law is crucial: While a traditional model of foreign policy rests 
on the idea that states are the makers and addressees of any common regulations and 
institutions, the humanitarian model focuses on the domesticating of state relations, i.e. on the 
idea that individuals are both makers and addressees of law. It follows that if Sophia testifies to 
a humanitarian foreign policy model one would not only expect Sophia to abide by international 
law. One would also expect Sophia to be conducted in accordance with the human rights 
conventions and with other relevant conventions protecting individual rights. Most importantly: 
even when colliding with material interests, such as when resulting in more people coming to 
the EU, or when involving particular costs to the EU or some of the member states, one would 
expect the EU would to promote and adhere to human rights law. 
 
2.3. Methodological approach  
To explore whether or not Sophia is in line with a humanitarian foreign policy model, 
the methodological approach applied in the analysis is to 1) study the justifications given for 
Sophia in order to uncover the mobilizing arguments behind its launch and conduct and 2) 




The relevance of such an analysis might be questioned on the grounds that there might be a big 
gap between what policy makers say and what they actually mean or do. This is, after all, the 
underlying assumption of the rational choice-based claim that references to norms are used 
mainly instrumentally, to help foreign policy actors promote particular material interests or will 
come second to interests only, as discussed above. In the analysis, I seek to control for rhetorical 
action by triangulating between different data sources, by examining the consistency of 
arguments presented across time, across different member states and EU institutions, and not 
least by controlling for consistency between what the EU says it is doing with Sophia and what 
actually does in theater. More precisely, to control for consistency between words and deeds, I 
draw on Kilian and Elgström (2010) and also study other actors’ perceptions and assessments 
of the operation. Given that the two main indicators of a humanitarian policy are that it promotes 
and binds itself to global human rights law, he UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), non-
governmental human rights groups (Human Rights Watch, Statewatch) and legal scholars’ 
assessments of Sophia when studying the relevance of the humanitarian model. What is more, 
I make no claims regarding the real or true motives behind Sophia. As rational choice theorists 
argue, it is impossible to uncover policy-makers ‘sincere’ motives and beliefs. This is, after all, 
why such perspectives for methodological reasons start from the assumption that actors are 
motivated by the aim of maximising self-interest. The methodological approach applied in this 
paper instead builds on two alternative assumptions. First, I assume that actors are 
communicatively rational, meaning that they have the ability to justify and explain their actions, 
and that they coordinate their behaviour through communication (Deitelhoff 2009; Eriksen and 
Weigård 2003; Risse 200; Sjursen 2002; Sjursen 2006a). Second, I expect that social action can 
be accounted for by interpreting what it was that made it intelligible to the actors involved 
(Eliaeson 2002: 52). On this basis, I assume that any agreement on a common EU foreign policy 
action, such as that of launching and later conducting a naval mission in a particular way, are 
based on arguments given by proponents that have to be comprehensible and acceptable for at 
least some co-decision makers for decisions such as that about Sophia to come about. 
Uncovering the arguments that led to a particular decision or action thus amounts to an 
explanation of this outcome. This approach is particularly relevant when seeking to understand 
foreign and policy decisions and actions, which after all rest on agreement between all the EU 
member states. The arguments leading to an agreement on a given policy (i.e. the mobilizing 
arguments) can of course refer to particular self-interests, as one would expect if Sophia was 




rational, one also allows for the possibility that the actors can ‘reflect on the validity of different 
norms, and why they should be complied with’ (Sjursen 2006b: 88), hence allowing also 
normative, and thus humanitarian, behaviour to be considered rational.  
 
2.4. Empirical expectations  
So, what one would expect to find if the EU with Sophia acts in line with a humanitarian 
foreign policy model? If this is so, one would expect first, that actors across different EU 
institutions and member states would refer to the moral and legal duty to rescue people in peril 
of being lost at sea when justifying the launch of operation. Second, migrants’ rights would also 
have to be consistently followed up in practice. Most importantly: even when colliding with 
material interests, such as when resulting in even greater migratory pressures at its borders, or 
when incurring particular costs to the EU or some of its member states, the EU would be 
expected to promote and adhere to human rights law. Building on Butler and Ratcovich (2016), 
the relevant legal obligations in this case are the following: (1) the Law of the sea (UNCLOS) 
duty to rescue any person in distress at the sea (p 248); (2) the 2004 amendment to the SOLAS 
convention requiring states to ‘disembark and deliver anyone rescued at sea to a ‘place of safety’ 
(Butler and Ratcovich 2016: 249) and; (3) the international and European human rights 
conventions and international refugee regulations (Butler and Ratcovich 2016: 251). Also the 
Preamble of the UN Security Council resolution 2240 (2015) underlines that all states must 
“comply with their obligations under inter-national law, including international human rights 
law and international refugee law.” Of particular importance in this regard is the respect for the 
“principal protection instrument of international refugee law”, namely the “obligation not to 
send refugees back to a place where they would be at risk of persecution” (non-refoulement, 
Butler and Ratcovich 2016: 251). This obligation is established in the Refugee Convention and 
a number of human rights treaties (ibid). This obligation is established in the UNHCR Refugee 
Convention and a number of human rights treaties (Ibid.). Thus, for Sophia to be characterised 
as humanitarian, it would not only have to abide by the provisions of international law. It must 
also be conducted as a search and rescue operation which prioritises the task of saving lives. At 
the same time, rescued persons should not be transported back to places that are unsafe or where 
they are at risk of prosecution, and such behaviour should be consistent, irrespective of the 
status of the migrants, in full respect of their human rights.  
If on the other hand the critics are right and Sophia indeed is in breach of the norms the 




line with a traditional foreign policy model. This implies first, that one would expect EU actors 
across institutions and member states to primarily justify Sophia by the need to launch an 
operation to reduce immigration. The EU may also refer to its obligation to assist people in 
distress at sea, and indeed conduct search and rescue, but such concerns would only be 
secondary in importance to the goal of reducing immigration and would not necessarily be 
promoted consistently. Instead, second, one would find evidence to suggest that the conduct of 
EU Sophia are in breach of the global, human rights laws discussed above. 
 
2.4.1 Data  
To explore whether or not Sophia is in line with a humanitarian foreign policy model, 
the analysis draws on the following sources. First, all official EU documents regarding the 
operation, from the Commission, the EEAS and the (European) Council. Unpublished working 
documents about the mission were collected from Wikileaks. Documents were also collected 
from a selection of member states, including Italy, who initially suggested an EU mission, and 
from two member states initially opposing it, namely Germany and the UK. News articles have 
also been a source for detecting these states’ positions. As discussed above, to study the extent 
to which the mission was conducted in line with the humanitarian hypothesis, data was collected 
from a number of observers and specialist: the UNCHR, the Council of Europe, a variety of 
human rights organizations including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty, the UK House of 
Lords, as well as from legal and other scholars. Lastly, to further triangulate the data, five 
interviews were conducted with EU civilian and military staff in 2017.  
 
3. Analysis: A humanitarian mission to help migrants in line with their human rights? 
3.1. Launched to save migrants in distress at sea? 
So, is Sophia a humanitarian, ‘normative’ operation, as claimed by the EU itself? First, 
we look at the member states’ decision to launch Sophia in 2015. Was it initially launched to 
help people in distress at sea, in line with a humanitarian foreign policy model? According to 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR 2018) 3,771 people died or 
went missing while crossing the Mediterranean in 2015. In 2016, the number rose to over 5,000, 
while 3139 people lost their lives in an attempt to reach Europe by sea in 2017. All the EU 
decisions regarding Sophia suggest that it initially was launched in response to these tragedies. 
For instance, in its special meeting on 23 April 2015, the heads of states stated: “The situation 




to prevent further loss of life at sea and to tackle the root causes of the human emergency that 
we face. Our immediate priority is to prevent more people from dying at sea” (European 
Council 2015a). This statement and the “strong commitment to act in order to prevent human 
tragedies resulting from the smuggling of people across the Mediterranean” was also underlined 
in the Foreign Affairs Council’s decision to launch a naval mission in May the same year 
(Council 2015). Similarly, according to HR/VP Mogherini, mission Sophia “is one of the stories 
of the E1uropean Union we can be proud of […] this is an important sign of the European unity 
we should be proud of again - : saving lives” (EEAS 2016b). 
Most importantly the data suggests that the 2015 accident in which a vessel carrying 
over 850 migrants capsized close to the Italian island of Lampedusa, is key to understanding 
why the mission was launched in the first place. With only 28 survivors, this marked the largest 
death toll ever known in a single incident in the Mediterranean (Bosilca 2017).  As we shall 
see, this accident functioned as a critical juncture, triggering consensus on an EU mission in 
response to the migrant crisis. At the time of the Lampedusa accident, Italy had concluded its 
own naval search and rescue mission, ‘Mare Nostrum’. Mare Nostrum was operational for over 
a year, in total rescuing more than 100,000 people. In parallel to conducting the operation, Italy 
was however trying to convince the other member states to jointly take over the responsibility 
for search an rescue by launching an EU mission within the CSDP framework. With a cost of 
more than 100 million Euros a year and increasing difficulties in handling all the boats coming, 
Italy ended its Mare Nostrum in October 2014, thereby placing further pressure on the EU 
member states to take over this task. However, despite the number of drowning increasing 
during 2014, many of the EU member states continued to opposed the idea of replacing Mare 
Nostrum with an EU search and rescue mission (The Guardian 2014). Instead, at the initiative 
of the Commission, agreement was reached on a new border control mission called Triton, to 
be coordinated by the EU border agency Frontex (Frontex 2017). Frontex, however, is a border 
control, internal security agency, and although rescuing a high number of people, Triton could 
only operate in the waters outside of Italy – not in the high seas where most of the accidents 
occurred. The capacity of Triton was also limited. As put by Frontex itself: “Of course, we will 
also do search and rescue actions,’ but if you don’t have enough capacity will you be there in 
time? I would expect many more sea deaths the moment that Mare Nostrum is withdrawn” (The 
 
1 This is not to be confused with the first Lampedusa accident which 
happened in 2013, but which did not result in any common reaction from the 




Guardian 2014.) Nonetheless, and in spite of hard criticism both from the Council of Europe 
and various human rights organizations, many EU member states continued to reject the Italy’s 
suggestion to launch an EU search and rescue mission. Several member states, including big 
countries Germany and the UK, even opposed the very idea of the EU taking any such actions, 
claiming instead that such operations would attract even more migrants to Europe. German 
Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière for example said about Mare Nostrum that it “was an 
emergency plan but has proven to be a bridge to Europe” (Hasselbach, 2014). Similarly, 
according to the UK, search and rescue missions would have an "unintended pull factor (…) 
They encourage more migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing, and thereby leading to 
more tragic deaths" (Joyce Analay, Minister of State at Britain's Foreign Office; Hasselbach 
2014). The data suggests that the Lampedusa accident changed these positions. Like many other 
observers, following the accident, the Council of Europe again called on “European 
governments to reaffirm their solidarity by putting in place a more effective and well-resourced 
European search and rescue initiative, creating alternative migration possibilities and increasing 
efforts to combat smuggling” (Council of Europe 2015). According to the Council of Europe, 
Lampedusa was a “tragedy that should have been avoided by all means. These deaths (…) put 
into question the decision to end the full-scale search-and-rescue mission Mare Nostrum in 
2014”, thus indirectly blaming the EU member states for not taking action (Council of Europe 
2015). And this time, previously reluctant member states positions changed in favour of a joint 
mission. Some of the member states, including Spain, Greece and France were already 
supporting further integration in the field of maritime security. But in other countries, including 
Germany and the UK, data indicates a clear shift in position following Lampedusa. Directly 
following the accident, German policy-makers for example referred to the need to take action 
to save lives. Chancellor Angela Merkel emphasized that such accidents have to be avoided at 
all cost, stressing that “everything - really everything - must be done in order to save lives” 
(DW 2015). Similarly, in the aftermath of the April accident, then Prime minister Cameron said 
that such tragedies marked “a dark day for Europe” (BBC 2015). The 2015 Lampedusa accident 
in other words functioned as a critical juncture, changing the positions of reluctant member 
states in favour of common EU action, allowing a consensus on an EU naval search and rescue 
mission to be reached. As Rear Admiral Credendino, the commander of Sophia explained to 
the Italian parliament: Before the accident, there were “extremely different opinions on the 
topic: there were the more interventionist, the less interventionist, and those who had other 




consensus was reached among member states “in less than a week” (ibid) and “the operation 
was launched in record time” (ibid).  
The importance of the Lampedusa accident for understanding the initial agreement to 
launch Sophia has also been confirmed in other studies. According for example to Tardy (2015: 
1), Sophia was launched due to a ‘strong commitment to act pledged by the Council following 
the death of 800 migrants.” Similarly, in its investigation of Sophia, the UK House of Lords’ 
report on finds that the mission came “in response to the loss of 700 lives in the Lampedusa 
tragedy”. It was on this basis that the European Council concluded that it would “mobilise all 
efforts at its disposal to prevent further loss of life at sea"' (House of Lords 2016: 5) There is 
little evidence to support the claim that concerns for reducing migration to Europe mobilized 
the member states’ initial decision to launch Sophia in 2015. Contrary to what one would expect 
if this was the case, there is no evidence to suggest that any cost-efficiency calculations were 
conducted at the time, or that a naval mission’s potential efficiency in curbing migration was 
discussed or known to the member states prior to their decision. It is even questionable whether 
policy-makers at the time regarded a naval mission as an efficient means to limit migration. To 
the contrary several of the member states, including Germany and the UK, as we have seen 
initially opposed an EU naval mission precisely on the grounds that a search and rescue 
operation could have a pull effect on potential migrants (Hasselbach 2014). As argued by Tardy 
in 2015 (2015: 4) “the operation cannot be a solution to the migrant crisis, and no one in 
Brussels is contending that it could.”  
 
3.2. The EU’s in theatre behaviour: In line with human rights? 
In sum, so far, the data suggests that the Lampedusa accident made initially reluctant 
member states change positions in favour of an EU search and rescue operation, hence leading 
to consensus on the initial decision to launch Sophia. So, does this therefore also imply that 
Sophia has also been conducted as a humanitarian mission, as argued by the EU itself? As we 
recall, if this is so, one would expect Sophia to have been conducted as a search and rescue 
mission, despite its costs or in cases of conflicting interests. In addition and most importantly, 
Sophia must have been conducted in accordance with relevant human rights law. In particular, 
migrants must have been treated in accordance with their human rights, rescued persons must 
not be transported back to places that are unsafe or where they are at risk of prosecution; and 




we turn to explore the implementation of Sophia, i.e. the EU’s behavior in theater, and how this 
has developed over time.  
Overall, the data reveals that although initially launched as a search and rescue 
operation, over time, Sophia has developed into a mission that is less focused on search and 
rescue and that is increasingly breaking with important human rights principles. On the one 
hand, Sophia was initially a de facto a search and rescue operation (House of Lords 2016). In 
April 2017, 35.037 lives had been rescued at sea by Sophia (EEAS 2017). Due to its search and 
rescue mandate, the UK house of Lords in 2016 hence concluded that “Operation Sophia have 
been ready and equipped to meet their commitments under the International Convention on 
Safety of Law at Sea (SOLAS) and the UN Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS) to rescue 
people in distress” (House of Lords 2016:18). One may also argue that the EU initially did 
search and rescue as required by international law in spite of the known costs of such an 
approach. After all, as discussed above “critics suggested that search and rescue activity by 
operation Sophia would act as a magnet to migrants and ease the task of smugglers, who would 
only need their vessels to reach the high seas” (House of Lords 2016: 3). After the first year, 
also human rights organizations and the UN applauded the EU for rescuing people in distress. 
In a speech at the European Policy Centre in Brussels United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNCHR) Filippo Grandi for example argued that the number of deaths at sea “would 
have been significantly higher had it not been for the search and rescue operations carried out 
by EU member states, coastguards and merchant ships, volunteers and NGOs” (Grandi 2016). 
Similarly, in 2015 Amnesty International found that the “results of the EU-coordinated naval 
operations for saving lives in the Mediterranean very soon emerged. The number of people who 
drowned or disappeared at sea in their attempts to reach European shores declined dramatically 
in the months following the deployment of naval forces. The death rate between January and 
April 2015 was 1 in 16, or 6.2%, while the numbers between April and June of the same year 
were significantly reduced to 1 in 427, or 0.23%” (Amnesty 2015). 
On the other hand, however, looking at the further development of Sophia, the EU’s in 
theater behavior is clearly not in line with a humanitarian model. To the contrary, the search 
and rescue focus of the mission is becoming less important, and it is increasingly clear that the 
EU does not live up to the human rights standards it claims to have set for its mission. 
Increasingly, the aim of preventing migrants from coming to Europe seems to be trumping 
human rights considerations. According to the EU itself “all of the activities undertaken in each 




law and the non refoulement principle meaning that no rescued persons can be disembarked in 
a third country” (EEAS 2016). Similarly, the Council`s Decision on Sophia states the operation 
is conducted in compliance with the relevant provisions of international law (Council 2015). 
Data however challenge this claim. On the one hand, Sophia is backed by a UN mandate to 
operate in international waters. As discussed above, the EU needs an UN mandate or consent 
by the Libyan authorities to operate in Libyan waters, and has respected this by not proceeding 
to the next phase of the mission. However, as discussed above, acting in accordance with 
international law is not enough for the operation to be in line with a humanitarian foreign policy 
model. As discussed above, the critical difference between a humanitarian and a more 
traditional model of foreign policy is not whether or not an actor follows the rules of the 
international system, but whether it promotes and acts in accordance with global norms, i.e. 
individual rights, in this case the requirements enshrined in the Refugee convention, the Human 
rights conventions and the duty to help people in distress under the Law of the sea. And from 
this perspective, the EU does not live up to the standards it claims to have set for its operation. 
In fact, and in-stead suggesting that the EU in its implementation of the mission is more 
concerned with curbing migration, a wide number of NGOs find that the EU approach “fails 
migrants by predominantly focusing on the challenges posed to the EU, rather than on those 
faced by the human beings whose lives continue to be lost at sea” (Berry et al 2016: 4).  
According to Berry et al (2016) “the key reason for the unwillingness of EU leaders to take a 
more decisive and coherent approach to the refugee crisis has been the high levels of public 
anxiety about immigration and asylum across Europe ( …)  In a number of countries in Europe 
(…) financial strains plus concerns over national security and cultural assimilation have 
encouraged the growth of far-right anti-immigrant parties and movements such as Golden 
Dawn, the Swedish Democrats, the National Front and Pegida” (Berry et al 2016: 3-4). The 
training of the Libyan coastguard and the cooperation with NATO is particularly problematic 
from a human rights perspective. Just before implementing these changes to Sophia’s mandate, 
Human Rights Watch (2016) noted that by training Libyan coastguard forces, the EU seeks to 
“bypass” the non-refoulement principle, so it wants ‘to outsource the dirty work to Libyan 
forces (…) the EU - soon perhaps with NATO’s help – is basically deputizing Libyan forces to 
help seal Europe’s border”. The fact that the EU`s policies result in preventing migrants from 
leaving Libya also infringe the right of individuals to leave any country, including their own 
(Human Rights Watch 2016). Similarly, other leading NGOs have been very vocal in criticizing 




Without Borders refusing to accept EU funding in sign of protest (Médecins Sans Frontières 
2016). In contrast to its very positive report of the EU Naval operation in 2015, Amnesty 
International in 2016 found that the extension of the operation to train the Libyan coastguard 
may have severe human rights implications, arguing that “the EU has repeatedly shown it is 
willing to stop refugees and migrants from coming to the continent at almost any cost now, with 
human rights taking a back seat” (Amnesty 2016). Its 2017 report is even more critical, arguing 
that by training and cooperating with the Libyan coastguard in Sophia, ’European governments 
are actively supporting a sophisticated system of abuse and exploitation of refugees and 
migrants by the Libyan Coast Guard, detention authorities and smugglers in order to prevent 
people from crossing the Mediterranean’ (Amnesty 2017).  
Also the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Fillippo Grandi has been 
very critical to “the narrowing of access to Europe” (Grandi 2016). Yet other observers have 
labeled Sophia as a “militarisation of a humanitarian crisis” (Rettman 2016).  Similarly, 
Ventrella (2016: 18) concludes that “the aim of Operation Sophia is more the achievement of 
peace and security by pre-venting the illegal entry of migrants within EU Member States.” 
Further in line with such a claim, in a restricted access report to the EU foreign and security 
institutions, Sophia’s mission Commander referred to the efficiency of the operation in reducing 
migration flows when reporting on its success: “There has been a reduction in the proportion 
of migrants using the central Mediterranean route as opposed to the eastern route. Prior to the 
start of the operation there was an even split between the people using the central route and the 
eastern route, whereas now 16 percent migrants use the central route, with almost 83percent of 
migrants using the eastern route. Secondly, since September, for the first time in 3 years, we 
have seen a 9 percent decrease. This is an encouraging decrease in the flow” (EEAS 2016b: 3). 
There is no specific reference to the need or rights of migrants, or justification of Sophia on the 
basis of search and rescue needs in the report. The rescue side of the mission is also discussed, 
for example when arguing that, as the mission moves to the next stages, it would be necessary 
“to have the right type and number of assets to protect the force and operate effectively both in 
the counter smuggling role and in the rescue role” (EEAS, 2016b: 20). However, there are no 
references to the EU’s obligations vis a vis refugees and migrants’ rights in the classified report. 
If rights-based arguments were used mainly rhetorically to legitimize interest-based behavior 
as one would expect following a rational choice based perspective, this is, one might argue, 
precisely what one would expect to find in a secret policy-document. What is more - the data 




challenges but nonetheless continue to conduct it due to their interest in curbing migration. 
According to Amnesty (2017), ’European governments have not just been fully aware of these 
abuses; by actively supporting the Libyan authorities in stopping sea crossings and containing 
people in Libya, they are complicit in these crimes.’ Also interviews with military staff and 
staff from the EU External Action Service confirm what both this article and other observers 
are claiming, namely that the mission indeed is breaking with the EU’s own normative, human 
rights standards.. Interviews with naval officers having sailed on EU flagged ships taking part 
in the Sophia mission for example suggest that the EU fleet increasingly is leaving the search 
and rescue part of the mission to NGO ships, with EU ships laying further out and observing 
their work rather than actively doing search and rescue themselves (informal interview, 
September 2017). Similarly, interviews both with staff from the EEAS and with military 
personnel taking part in the missions confirmed that the EU itself indeed knows that there are 
severe human rights challenges linked not only to Sophia but also the EU’s wider policies vis 
a vis Libya (interviews 2017). For example, when asked about it during an interview, a high 
level advisor to the High Representative confirmed that the EU is well aware of the ways in 




4 Concluding Remarks 
This article set out to conduct a critical assessment of EU mission Sophia, asking 
whether or not it is in line with the normative principles the EU has set for itself in the conduct 
of its foreign policy, including Sophia. To do this, it asked whether or not the mission is in line 
with a humanitarian  foreign policy model. Conducting the analysis in two steps in line with the 
main criteria of such a model – first exploring Sophia’s launch and then assessing the EU’s in 
theater conduct –  findings suggest that although concerns for migrants at sea indeed seem to 
have mobilized the initial launch of the mission, the conduct of the mission is not in line with 
key human rights principles. On the one hand, the 2015 Lampedusa accident changed reluctant 
member states’ positions in favour of an EU mission and thus helped forge consensus amongst 
the EU member states on the need to act in the face of the increasing number of people losing 
their lives at sea in an attempt to reach Europe. The analysis also suggests that the Union has 
respected international law, including Libya’s right to sovereign control of its own borders, that 




to wait for a UNSC resolution or invitation by the Libyan government before extending the 
operation to Libyan waters. On the other hand, however, the analysis of the EU’s in theater 
behavior suggests that Sophia is not conducted in accordance with relevant human rights law. 
In fact, according both to observers, the UN, the Council of Europe various human rights 
organizations and even EU military staff and civilian officials, the EU does not live up to the 
human rights standards it claims to have set for itself in the conduct of the operation. Although 
initially launched as a search and rescue mission, EU Sophia is not a humanitarian mission. As 
the operation mandate is amended and updated with new tasks, and as the EU-NATO in theater 
cooperation increases, there is also evidence to suggest that the EU is moving further away from 
what one would expect of a humanitarian foreign policy actor. Although one should be careful 
with drawing broader conclusions on the basis of one case study, by being one of the few 
concrete EU actions agreed in response to the migration crisis, this study hence questions the 
legitimacy not only of Sophia but also of the EU’s migration policies more broadly. Instead, it 
suggests that as the migration crisis continues and Sophia is further amended, the aim of 
preventing migrants from coming to Europe increasingly seems to be trumping human rights 
considerations. This finding breaks with previous studies, including of other EU military 
missions, suggesting the opposite – namely that in the EUs foreign and security policies, human 
rights trump particular interests. Some may however argue that this case is not really 
representative of the EU’s foreign and security as a whole. After all, the migration crisis is ‘an 
extraordinary moment when the existence and viability of the political order are called into 
question’ in line with Ikenberry’s commonly used definition of what constitutes a crisis 
(Ikenberry 2008: 3; Cross and Ma 2015). Indeed, the migration crisis is challenging the very 
basis of the EU polity, challenging both the internal solidarity and the free movement across 
the inner marked. One may also argue that this situation is particularly challenging to the EU 
as it has to be seen in relation to the increased fear of terrorism amongst the EU population and 
the need to take action to hinder migration to reduce the support of populist parties. One may 
however also argue the opposite, as I have done in this article, namely that rather than not being 
representative of the EU’s foreign and security policy, it is situations like this who really put 
the EU’s normative behaviour to a test. If the EU really wants to act in a principled way, 
respecting international law and human rights, it must do so also when such policies come with 
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